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Decided on August 18, 2021
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
2114 Realty LLC, Petitioner,
against
Estate of Rosa Sanabria, Jaime Lopez, as Next of Kin, Respondents.

L & T 96735/18
Kimberley Slade, J.
Recitation pursuant to CPLR § 2219 (a) of the papers considered in the review of this
motion:

Notice of Motion 1

Affirmation in Opposition 2

Reply 3
This is a nonpayment proceeding in which a petition dated December 20, 2018 seeks

arrears due at the time for October 2018 (partial), and November and December 2018 at
$942.32 per month. The case appeared on the calendar for the first time on January 24, 2019
at which point an order entered adjourning the matter to February 27, 2019 and which
directed repairs. The court file for this day indicates that the Court contacted the office for
Adult Protective Services (APS) and was informed that Jaime Lopez was already an APS
client. Appropriate notifications and referrals were made for the February 27, 2019
adjournment. On February 27, 2019, Brooklyn Legal Services filed a notice of appearance
and the matter was adjourned for Respondent to file an answer. The matter was again
adjourned to April 30, 2019 and then to May 1, 2019 with no indication as to whether
Petitioner or Respondent sought or consented to the adjournment. Then, on May 1, 2019,
APS indicated that they had closed their case with Respondent as, in their assessment, he had
"sufficient capacity." On May 18, 2019 the matter was adjourned to June 19, 2019 after
Petitioner accepted Respondent's motion to dismiss and for leave to file an amended answer
served in court. On June 19, 2019 the matter was adjourned to August 6, 2019 to permit
Petitioner to assess the impact that the HSTPA might have on this proceeding.
On August 27, 2019, the case was adjourned to September 30, 2019 for Petitioner's
opposition to the motion and for reply. On September 30, 2019, the Court directed
Petitioner's opposition be served with a warning that in the event of default Respondent's
motion would be decided on default. That motion was fully briefed, then decided, and upon
allowing the amended answer and denying the remaining forms of relief sought, the matter
was restored to the calendar on December 20, 2019. On this date the case was adjourned for
Petitioner's motion for discovery as there was no consent to discovery by Respondent. On
February 5, 2020 the motion [*2]appeared on the calendar. A portion of the discovery motion
was settled by stipulation and the remainder taken on submission by this Court on March 10,
2020. On March 27, 2020, the decision on the remaining discovery motion was rendered, but
that was shortly after the Courts had ceased functioning as to all but emergency matters due
to the onset of the Covid19 pandemic.
The matter was then restored to the Court's conference calendar on September 16, 2020.
At this time Petitioner's verbal request for use and occupancy was denied, and Petitioner was
instructed to make its motion in writing on notice to Respondent. The matter was adjourned
to October 26, 2020, December 8, 2020 and finally to December 22, 2020 for completion of
the within motion. Since the initial restoration to the calendar following the Court's
shutdown, Respondent served multiple subpoenas, the case was conferenced multiple times,
and Petitioner actively sought use and occupancy. Shortly thereafter the legislature enacted
the Covid19 Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 (CEEFPA) that

stayed all court proceedings for sixty days that did not involve nuisance type of activity.
Thereafter, Respondent filed a Hardship Declaration and the proceeding was ultimately
stayed through August 31, 2021.
Now, pursuant to RPL Section 220 and RPAPL Section 745(2)(a) Petitioner seeks an
award of use and occupancy owed through November 2020 in the amount of $23,699.80 and
seeks use and occupancy pendente lite at a rate of $942.32 from December 2020 and
thereafter. Respondent opposes the motion in its entirety.
Prior to the enactment of the HSTPA, RPAPL 745(2)(a) provided the framework for
assessing such a request. That statute provided:
(a) In a summary proceeding upon the second of two adjournments at the request
of the respondent, or, upon the thirtieth day after the first appearance of the parties
in court less any days that the proceeding has been adjourned upon the request of
the petitioner, whichever occurs sooner, the court shall direct that the respondent,
upon an application by the petitioner, deposit with the court within five days sums
of rent or use and occupancy accrued from the date the petition and notice of
petition are served upon the respondent, and all sums as they become due for rent
and use and occupancy.
Two adjournments shall include an adjournment requested by a respondent
unrepresented by counsel for the purpose of securing counsel made on a return
date of the proceeding. Such rent or use and occupancy sums shall be deposited
with the clerk of the court or paid to such other person or entity, including the
petitioner or an agent designated by the division of housing and community
renewal, as the court shall direct or shall be expended for such emergency repairs
as the court shall approve.
The HSTPA significantly changed the framework within and under what circumstances
a request for use and occupancy can be made and granted. For cases commenced after the
enactment of the HSTPA, a petitioner may only make such a motion in writing, at the
earliest, on the sixtieth day after the case has appeared, less an initial adjournment sought for
purposes of obtaining counsel. The only days that may be counted are adjournments at the
sole request of respondent. The Court now may, upon a consideration of the equities, "direct
that the respondent, upon a motion on notice made by the petitioner, deposit with the Court
sums of rent and use and occupancy that shall accrue subsequent to the date of the court's
order ". RPAPL Section 745(2)(a) as amended.
RPL Section 220 provides that "the landlord may recover reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of real property, by any person, under an agreement, not made by

deed; [*3]and a parol lease or other agreement may be used as evidence of the amount to
which he is entitled."
Petitioner relies upon both RPL Section 220 and RPAPL 745(2) in support of its motion.
Petitioner cites MMB Assoc. v. Dayan, 169 AD2d 422 (1st Dep't 1991) [citing Haddad Corp.
v. Redmond Studio, 102 AD2d 730 (1st Dep't 1984) and Corris v. 129 Front Co., 85 AD2d
176 (1st Dep't 1982)] for the general proposition that such an award "accommodates the
competing interests of the parties in affording necessary and fair protection to both and
preserves the status quo until a final judgment is rendered." MMB Assoc., 169 AD2d 422,
422 (internal citations omitted). Under a theory of quantum meruit, Petitioner relies upon
BGB Realty, LLC v. Annunziata, 12 Misc 3d 136(A) (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2006), Eighteen
Assoc. v. Nanjim Leasing Corp., 257 AD2d 559 (2d Dep't 1991), and under a theory of unjust
enrichment relies upon Phillips & Huyler Assoc. v. Flynn, 225 AD2d 475 (1st Dep't 1996).
Petitioner argues both that if Respondent is not required to pay pendente lite use and
occupancy that Respondent will be unjustly enriched, and that an obligation to pay use and
occupancy is necessary to "bring about justice without reference to the intent of the parties."
Eighteen Assoc., 257 Ad2d 559, 560.
Respondent opposes the motion arguing that as Respondent is disabled and has limited
income, that an award of use and occupancy will severely prejudice him as he will be unable
to make such payments because he does not have a lease. Respondent contends that without a
lease he is ineligible for and precluded from seeking either arrears or ongoing payments
through various programs that might otherwise assist him with a rent subsidy if he were
awarded a lease. Respondent further argues that the portion of the motion made pursuant to
RPAPL 745(2) should be denied as its timing within the context of this litigation is highly
prejudicial to Respondent, and its application would violate Respondent's rights to due
process as he would face the penalty of either potentially having his answer stricken and
defenses dismissed or be sent to an immediate trial before the completion of discovery. He
argues that this Court should be guided by the changes contained in the HSTPA, as those
changes reflect a disavowal by the legislature of the potentially harsh and occasionally
draconian application of the former iteration of RPAPL 745(2).
Respondent argues, correctly, that "it is clear that under 745 as amended, the Court
could not order Mr. Lopez to deposit the accumulated arrears in this case and would be
constrained to order only that, at most, he prospectively pay 30% of his social security
benefit. Although courts have continued to apply the old version of RPAPL 745 to
proceedings that were already pending when the HSTPA was enacted, the Court nevertheless

maintains its discretion to balance the equities in order to avoid the unduly harsh and
prejudicial effects of the rent deposit law which the legislature sought to ameliorate."
(Respondent's Memorandum of Law, page 3, passim).
Respondent argues that the court in BAE 193 Realty LLC v. Rosales, 63 Misc 3d 948
(Civ. Ct., Bronx Co. 2019) struck the right chord when it exercised its discretion to negate the
due process concerns articulated in Lang v. Pataki, 271 AD2d 375 (1st Dep't 2000), affirming
176 Misc 2d 676 (Sup. Ct., NY Co. 1998) but that were discussed in that context as a
potential concern that did not undermine the legality of the statute. Respondent further
opposes the award of use and occupancy based on RPL 220 arguing that it is an
"inappropriate remedy for the posture of the instant case." During the pendency of a
proceeding, orders for use and occupancy are governed by RPAPL 745 and Respondent cites
Quality & Ruskin Assoc. v. London, 8 Misc 3d 102 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2005) for that
proposition. There, petitioner commenced a licensee holdover proceeding and respondent
answered raising succession among other defenses. [*4]Petitioner crossmoved for various
forms of relief including discovery and use and occupancy pendente lite. The court in that
decision did not specifically rule on the RPL 220 issue but determined that as thirty days had
not elapsed when the motion was made, the motion was premature under that statute. The
court there also treated petitioner's motion for discovery as an application by petitioner for an
adjournment. In other words, petitioner sought relief and thus generated the delay by making
a motion.
In concurring with the outcome of the majority as to the discovery ruling, Justice
Patterson disagreed with the denial of a grant of use and occupancy stating, "[i]n my view,
the court below retains the discretionary authority to grant interim use and occupancy as
necessary to balance equitably the parties' competing interests, particularly where the
proceedings are delayed by such motion practice and disclosure as the parties may require."
Quality & Ruskin Assoc., 8 Misc 3d 102, 106. But then he goes on to state, "[a]warding use
and occupancy would not harm occupant, as he would be required to pay any outstanding
rent in the event he were to prevail. Indeed, it would be patently unfair to permit occupant to
remain in the premises without paying for its use." Id., citing MMB Assoc. v. Dayan, 169
AD2d 422 (1st Dep't 1991). As this case predates 615 Nostrand Ave. Corp. v. Roach, 15
Misc 3d 1 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2006) the question as to how to balance all of these
considerations in a case where a successor prevails on his claim, and therefore is not
obligated to pay rental arrears, is not addressed. Additionally, if the delay in the proceeding is
attributable to the Petitioner in Quality & Ruskin Assoc. for having moved for discovery why
should principles of reciprocity not apply in this proceeding where Respondent, who bears

the burden on the affirmative defense of succession, fails to provide discovery upon a request
and thereafter Petitioner is obligated to move for this relief and generate delay. This was not
argued in this proceeding and thus is not ruled upon, but the guiding principles underscore
the equitable considerations in these decisions. And while this Court does not view Petitioner
as having moved at a time designed to generate prejudice, the use and occupancy motion
could have been made in tandem with the discovery motion, but it was not.
In line with and underscoring the nuanced complications related to this issue,
Respondent argues that Petitioner has not shown his liability for arrears that accrued under
the lease of his mother and consequently under the authority of 615 Nostrand Ave. Corp. he
would not be obligated for arrears that accrued in the absence of an independent tenancy. He
argues that a grant of such relief would inappropriately relieve Petitioner of its burden of
proving the allegations in this nonpayment petition. While this may be correct as to rent, rent
and use and occupancy serve different purposes and derive from separate authorities. One is
contractbased and the other from principles of equity and fairness and derive from a Court's
authority and obligation to balance the equitable interests of the parties.
In assessing whether or not the Respondent must, or should, be obligated to pay use and
occupancy in this matter the Court notes that this case does fall within the ambit of the pre
HSTPA version of RPAPL 745(2) and further notes that that the HSTPA sought to prevent
instances where respondents, such as Respondent in this matter, lack sufficient resources to
pay a lump sum of accumulated arrears once the litigation is well underway. In instances
such as this, the outcome of a strict application of the statute, assuming Respondent's
responsibility for sufficient delay, would require a rent deposit of outstanding arrears and the
ongoing payments of use and occupancy pendente lite without regard or consideration being
given to the specific circumstances of a litigant within the confines of a case. And as it relates
to potential successors, [*5]without regard to the impact of the Court awarding possessory
relief based upon the failure to pay and where payments may be impossible without the
assistance of an agency and where the occupant may ultimately be entitled to a lease as a
matter of law.
Case law that has addressed this issue has identified and relied upon statutory authority
in awarding or declining to grant use and occupancy, theories of fairness—implicit or
explicit, [eg., Eli Haddad Corp. v Cal Redmond Studio, 476 NYS2d 864, (1st Dep't 1984),
Phillips & Huyler Assoc. v. Flynn, 225 AD2d 475 (1st Dep't 1996)], quantum meruit [eg.,
BGB Realty, LLC v. Annunziata, 12 Misc 3d 136(A) (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2006), Eighteen
Associates, LLC v. Nanjim Leasing Corp., 257 AD2d 559 (2d Dep't 1991)], the court's

"inherent" authority, the "traditional powers of a court of equity" [eg., Corris v. 129 Front
Co., 85 AD2d 176 (1st Dep't 1982)]. In many of the discussions at the appellate level
surrounding this issue courts have rested their final analysis on the idea of whether or not a
deciding court has providently exercised its discretion. See eg.: 500 Cathedral Parkway LLC,
v. Gutierrez, 111 NYS3d 798 (App. Term, 1st Dep't 2018), Esposito v. Larig, 106 NYS3d 92
(2d Dep't 2019), Kingsley v. 300 W 106th St. Corp., 78 NYS3d 84 (1st Dep't 2018).
The recurring theme in all of the above cases, and the case law as a body, is that courts
do have the authority to and should fashion relief to mitigate against harm where possible,
but at the same time should attempt to balance the rights and interests of the parties so that
neither is treated unjustly or unfairly. In this matter Petitioner's motion comes after many
months of litigation. And Petitioner's moving papers do not spell out or particularize the
specific timeframes or delay that it believes is attributable to Respondent. Rather, Petitioner
observes that the case has been pending for a protracted period of time and asserts that it
made its use and occupancy application at the first viable opportunity following resumption
of court activities. Respondent relies on Quality & Ruskin Assoc. v. London, 8 Misc 3d 102
(App. Term, 2d Dep't 2005) for the proposition that RPAPL 745(2) is the only basis upon
which use and occupancy may be granted, but that case assigns the delay in the proceeding to
petitioner who moved for discovery—Respondent in this proceeding moved for dismissal
and thereafter, Petitioner for discovery, and currently, this motion for use and occupancy.
In the initial phase of litigation, the delay in this case is attributable to the Court's efforts
to involve APS. Although no motions were made during this stage, the adjournments, while
at the Court's direction, do not appear from the record to be opposed by Petitioner.
Subsequently, motion practice ensued and was consensually scheduled. The file does not
indicate opposition to any of the adjournments attributable to the motion to dismiss. While it
is arguable that Petitioner was forced to make a discovery motion as Respondent declined to
consent to what Petitioner describes as "carefully or narrowly tailored discovery," the record
again does not provide a meaningful history of opposition.
Upon restoration of the matter to the calendar following the Court's cessation of
activities, Petitioner correctly asserts it commenced seeking use and occupancy as soon as it
was possible or as practicable following the limited resumption of court operations. Thus,
while there appears to be consent or acquiescence to the various events that caused delay and
which are typical to this type of proceeding, this Court does not find that Petitioner failed to
request use and occupancy in a manner or at a time that deliberately sought to prejudice
Respondent. It appears instead that this case was proceeding in the normal course of events

when the pandemic disrupted normal court functions and caused significant delay.
The three sources of potential authority for the grant of use and occupancy are discussed
[*6]above. A grant of use and occupancy under the earlier version of RPAPL 745, if granted,
would presumably result at some point in a striking of Respondent's defenses and an
immediate transfer to a trial part, assuming arguendo that Respondent was assigned sufficient
blame for the delay in this proceeding. The affidavits indicate that Respondent is indigent and
would be unable to pay the accumulated arrears or ongoing use and occupancy as his income
is less than the monthly rent for the apartment and there appears to be no mechanism to
obtain a commitment for repayment from any of the programs from which he might be
eligible for a rental subsidy in the absence of a lease.
The subsequent version of RPAPL 745 contained in the HSTPA does not apply to this
proceeding but provides guidance as to the current legislature's intent. However, this case
was commenced and begun under the framework of a prior legislature whose intent was
manifested in that legislation. It would be unfair to simply apply the current use and
occupancy statute to Petitioner's request as it is entitled to rely on the statute in effect when
this case commenced, and who correctly moved for this relief under the earlier version of the
statute. If the current version of the law is applied Petitioner will be, at most, be awarded
ongoing use and occupancy in the amount of onethird of Respondent's social security benefit
from the time of this order — clearly a significant reduction in what Petitioner might
otherwise be entitled to. Moreover, the old language mandates use and occupancy while the
newer version leaves some aspects of the grant within a court's discretion. The language is
permissive and not mandatory.
Finally, RPL 220 is the most amorphous of authorities in a summary proceeding, but it
is available and has been utilized. While it is preferable to use the statute most specifically
tailored to a case, not all cases and circumstances fit within the same mold. In its reply to the
motion Petitioner argues at paragraph 44, "[n]othing in the text of RPL 220 limits recovery of
use and occupancy to a plenary action. Further, courts frequently consider equitable
principles and the theory of quantum meruit in determining and granting motions for use and
occupancy in summary proceedings. Just because recovery under RPL 220 is an alternative
and independent basis for recovery of use and occupancy does not limit the availability of
recovery thereunder in a plenary action."
Respondent's mother passed on March 19, 2018. The petition seeks arrears from
October 2018 through December 2018. The most recent lease expired on January 31, 2020.

Respondent is sued in his capacity as "next of kin" under the laws in effect prior to passage
of the HSTPA. Pursuant to an order of the Honorable Kevin McClanahan this matter is to
proceed on Respondent's succession claim as a partyininterest asserting a possessory claim.
Respondent argues that he should not be liable for the arrears that accrued under the
lease of his mother pursuant to 615 Nostrand Ave. Corp. v. Roach, 15 Misc 3d 1 (App. Term,
2d Dep't 2006). In that proceeding the landlord refused to provide the tenant with a proper
lease after a determination by the Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR)
that the tenant was entitled to succeed to the apartment. The court found that this prevented
the tenant from obtaining the arrears from the Department of Social Services. The appellate
court held that it was proper for the lower court to limit the landlord to a nonpossessory
judgment for the period sought in the petition up until the landlord provided the tenant with a
lease. The court stated, "because landlord refused to offer tenant a proper lease prior to
December 2003, there was no agreement and no landlordtenant relationship between the
parties prior to that date." 615 Nostrand Ave. Corp., 15 Misc 3d 1, 3. As the court considered
the landlord's failure to provide a lease to the tenant to have prevented the tenant from being
able to obtain the arrears, the relief [*7]granted was limited to a nonpossessory judgment.
The court inherently endorsed the lower court's use of equity where the lower court
determined that the monies were owed but disallowed the landlord's possessory claim as that
would have made payment impossible for the tenant through the only means available at the
time. The assignment of blame to the landlord for failing to provide the lease as directed by
DHCR is apparent throughout the decision. And the consequence the preclusion of the
arrears from a possessory judgment and relegated to monetary relief only.
That case differs from this case in a few ways. In this case, Petitioner specifically
disputes Respondent's succession claim and seeks to litigate this issue. In 615 Nostrand Ave.
Corp., DHCR had already made the determination to award a lease to the tenant and the
landlord then inexplicably refused to provide a lease for well over a year, and its failure to
provide the lease was the direct cause of the tenant's inability to obtain payment of the then
sizeable arrears owed. Here, no lease has been ordered or awarded and it would be inherently
inequitable to make a determination that during a time where succession is being litigated, a
landlord is fully precluded from receiving any payments as no landlord/tenant relationship,
"express or implied," has been created, and while the tenant is using and occupying the
premises
To determine that a landlord who disputes succession cannot collect monies during the
time of litigation, as there is no lease "express or implied," would create an entirely

inequitable framework for such litigation and place a landlord at an immediate and unfair
disadvantage. A landlord would have to choose between litigation without the ability to
collect rents or other payments, and potentially prevailing on the succession issue but having
no recourse as to the monies foregone. Providing use and occupancy to the landlord under
some such circumstances is the only way to level the playing field where the question of
whether a successor will become a tenant is in limbo during the course of the litigation and
where the prospective successor remains in possession enjoying use and occupation of the
premises. If a landlord in good faith disputes and prevails against the prospective successor it
will receive possession and potentially a monetary judgment, and if he is unsuccessful on the
succession claim, the tenant receives a lease and is only required to pay the rent going
forward from the time he is offered a new lease. In either event, without awarding use and
occupancy a landlord risks lengthy litigation without compensation while the tenant receives
the benefit of housing.
Thus, in the absence of rent, use and occupancy is the remaining option if and when
payments are to be required. And, it is noted, that while the two can be and frequently are the
same or approximately the same amount the authority for their award and their purpose
differs. Rent derives from a contract or an agreement, while use and occupancy derives,
literally, from use and occupancy of a place and from a sense of equity, fairness and
ultimately from a desire to "balance equities" between litigants where succession is asserted
and disputed.
In this proceeding there are no monies sought from the time when Rosa Sanabria was
alive. The demand and petition commenced after her demise but prior to the expiration of her
lease. The case falls under preHSTPA RPAPL 745(2) but the realities of Respondent's
financial situation and his dependency on a program to assist with his rent places him in a
similar scenario to that of respondent in 615 Nostrand Ave. Corp. However, unlike the
scenario in that case and others cited above, this case is not characterized by Petitioner's
delay or failure to provide a lease that prejudices Respondent.
Under the circumstances of this proceeding Petitioner is awarded use and occupancy
pendente lite from the date of Petitioner's verbal application for use and occupancy in
September [*8]2020, which shall commence retroactively to October 1, 2020 and continue
until such time as this matter is resolved on the merits and Respondent's succession claim
adjudicated. In the event that Respondent is able to obtain a written commitment from a
program within 60 days of this order demonstrating that they will undertake to retroactively
pay the remainder of his use and occupancy from the time in this order upon his being

granted a lease, he may pay one-third of his social security benefit from the time of such
approval until such time as the matter is resolved. If there is no such approval he shall remain
responsible for the full use and occupancy.
Under the facts of this case, as the Court does not find sufficient exclusive delay
attributable to Respondent to trigger an award of all use and occupancy post-petition
pursuant to RPAPL 745 (pre-HSTPA) that portion of the motion is denied with leave to
renew at the

appropriate time or at the trial of this matter.
This matter was submitted for decision prior to the passage of CEEFPA and stayed
pending Respondent's filing of a Hardship declaration. As Chrysafis v. Marks , 594 US (2021), has stayed the enforcement of Part A of CEEFPA this case is no longer stayed.
Pursuant to A0/245/21 this matter will be scheduled for a conference on August 30, 2021
with the Court Attorney of the Part in Part G at 10:30 AM at which time the status of
discovery, potential settlement or referral to trial will be discussed.

Dated: August 18, 2021

Brooklyn, NY

Kimberley Slade, JHC
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